



























Labor Union and Linguistic Attributes in Firm Disclosure 
 
Abstract 
Prior accounting studies on labor unions show whether, when, and how frequently managers 
disclose in order to gain bargaining power. Yet, little research examines managers’ language 
itself in the presence of labor unions, especially using a rich communication channel such as 
earnings conference calls. By disentangling the two latent components of linguistic complexity 
(i.e. obfuscation and information) using conference call transcripts, I find that firms with stronger 
labor unions tend to disclose less information and, surprisingly, less obfuscation at the same 
time. However, the negative association between obfuscation and union strength is driven by the 
negative tone subsample, indicating that the strategic obfuscation of negative news is more likely 
for firms with a weaker labor union since strong unionized firms tend to be forthcoming about 
negative information to gain bargaining power and reserve resources. I also directly show that 
unionized firms are more likely to use negative words in their disclosures, consistent with 
previous literature that argues unionized firms signal negative outlooks to discourage employees’ 
demands. Overall, these results suggest that the high information asymmetry of unionized firms 
is contributed not only by the low information level in managerial narratives, but also by the 
more negative tone in their disclosures on conference calls. This study examines not only a 
specific disclosure channel, but also the nuanced linguistic elements via which information 
asymmetry of unionized firms becomes more severe.  
 















The effects of labor unions have been researched by academics over the past decades 
(e.g. Faleye et al. 2006; Hamm et al. 2018; Hilary 2006). Labor unions have more influence on 
corporate decisions and stronger negotiation power compared to their non-unionized 
counterparts, because of their ability to withdraw contribution through strikes and equity 
ownership (e.g. Faleye et al. 2006; Prevost et al. 2012). In 2018, there were at least 20 major 
strikes involving 485,000 workers in the United States.1 Since 1986, this year has the most 
workers that engaged in work stoppages and other disputes. Organized labor has also notched 
some significant victories over the past years. They have prompted California, Massachusetts 
and cities such as Seattle to increase their minimum wage to or toward $15 an hour. Previous 
studies on labor unions show whether, when, and how frequently managers disclose information 
(e.g. Bova 2013; Bova et al. 2014; Chung et al. 2015). However, few studies examine how they 
disclose regarding the language itself, especially in a rich communication channel such as 
conference calls.  
In this paper, I investigate a previously unexplored link between labor unions and subtle 
linguistic elements of managerial disclosure by addressing the question of how powerful 
stakeholders (e.g. employees) affect disclosure strategy and language in the conference call 
setting. Stated differently, I attempt to examine how managers adjust their linguistic attributes 
and intentions (i.e. information vs. obfuscation) to maximize their interests in the face of strong 
labor unions. Since recent literature suggests that unionized firms tend to signal negative 
outlooks to discourage employees’ demand for wage increases (Bova 2013; Chung et al. 2015), I 
also analyze another important linguistic attribute on earnings conference calls – tone. 
 
1 For more details, see http://time.com/5525512/american-workers-strikes-bureau-labor-statistics/. 
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Collectively, this paper aims to fill the void on the positive association between labor union 
strength and information asymmetry by indicating not only a specific disclosure channel, but also 
the linguistic mechanisms via which information asymmetry of unionized firms becomes greater.  
This paper is motivated by two studies – Hilary (2006) and Bushee et al. (2018). Hilary 
(2006) argues that firms facing stronger labor unions tend to preserve information asymmetry to 
gain bargaining power against labor unions. Consistent with his prediction, he finds that 
unionized firms are associated with higher information asymmetry. In another line of research, 
Bushee et al. (2018) examine linguistic complexity in firm disclosures. They illustrate that 
linguistic complexity commingles two latent components—obfuscation and information—that 
are related to information asymmetry in opposite directions. Specifically, they find that the 
information component of linguistic complexity is negatively associated with information 
asymmetry whereas the obfuscation component is positively associated with information 
asymmetry.  
Many scholars interpret high disclosure complexity as an intentional strategy by 
managers to obfuscate (e.g. Bova et al. 2014; Li 2008). These studies often use the Fog measure 
to examine the complexity or readability2 of annual reports (i.e. 10-K filings) (e.g. De Franco et 
al. 2012; Li 2008). The idea behind this measure is that corporate filings should be easy to 
understand in order to decrease information processing costs for users. Thus, high Fog measure 
suggests low reporting quality. Consistent with this assumption, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) show 
that managers strategically inform and obfuscate since they need to balance the benefits of 
enhanced disclosure with the costs of transferring information to competitors. Also, managers 
tend to hide information and intentionally obfuscate to engage in self-interested activities. 
 
2 Readability and complexity are often used interchangeably in this line of research. 
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However, complex language could also represent necessary information regarding firms’ 
complex business environments (Bloomfield 2008; Bushee et al. 2018). Therefore, it is important 
to identify the underlying information element and obfuscation element out of the existing 
complexity measure (i.e. Fog index) in order to properly evaluate reporting quality and capture 
managerial intentions behind firm disclosures. 
Using linguistic features of managerial disclosures on conference calls offers a great way 
to understand why and how managers disclose information in the presence of labor unions. 
Public earnings conference calls are one of the most important tools for conveying the company 
message (e.g. Brown et al. 2018). Over the past decades, researchers have employed this 
disclosure channel because of its unique characteristics. First, unlike mandatory disclosures, the 
language on conference calls reflects less boilerplate information, and is more likely to show 
managers’ disclosure strategies or intentions (Bushee et al. 2018). Further, conference calls 
provide additional cues compared to other disclosure channels. In addition, existing literature 
suggests that conference calls contain more complex information (Kimrough and Louis 2011; 
Matsumoto et al. 2011; Skinner 2019).  
Unions require information to act effectively since they do not possess firms’ detailed 
information regarding production and financing (Leap 1991). Despite the benefits from voluntary 
disclosure of information (e.g. Dye 1985; Jovanovic 1982), managers have an incentive to 
disclosure less since they know that labor unions actively collect and use firms’ information to 
enhance their negotiation ability and extract rents from companies (e.g. Chung et al. 2015; 
Hamm et al. 2018). Prior literature illustrates this theory empirically by showing that revealing 
information weakens firms’ positions in gaining bargaining power (e.g. Chung et al. 2015) while 
possessing more information enables labor unions to receive more resources and benefits 
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(Kleiner and Bouillon 1988). Additionally, Reynolds et al. (1998) indicate that firms often hide 
or misrepresent their true positions in labor negotiations. Thus, as the influence of unions and 
their ability to extract profits increase, managers have stronger incentives to disclose less 
information. 
While it is reasonable to extend the above arguments and predict that managers of firms 
with strong labor unions disclose more obfuscation in order to maintain information advantage, 
there could exist an opposite conjecture: firms with strong unions tend to present less 
obfuscation. The obfuscation hypothesis (Courtis 1998) suggests that management mainly uses 
confusing languages to obscure bad news (e.g. Li 2008; Smith and Taffler 1992; Subramanian et 
al. 1993). However, Chung et al. (2015) show that managers facing strong labor unions are 
motivated to disclose bad news in a timely manner in order to preserve their bargaining power in 
labor negotiations. Thus, firms with strong labor unions might have fewer incentives to 
obfuscate.  
I find that managers of firms with stronger labor unions tend to present lower information 
level of linguistic complexity on earnings conference calls as well as lower obfuscation level of 
linguistic complexity. Furthermore, I show that the negative association between the obfuscation 
component and union measures is stronger in the negative tone subsample, whereas it is weaker 
in the positive tone subsample. These results are consistent with the obfuscation hypothesis and 
indicate that strategic obfuscation (mainly of negative news) is more likely for firms with a 
weaker labor union, since strong unionized firms use negative information to gain bargaining 
power and reserve resources. 
Building on the prior findings that unionized firms are more likely to send out negative 
outlooks to discourage employees’ demand (Bova 2013; Chung et al. 2015), I next examine 
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whether managers of firms with stronger labor unions tend to use more negative tone on 
conference calls. The results show that these managers indeed deliberately use more negative 
words.  
Overall, this paper shows that the high information asymmetry of unionized firms (e.g. 
Hilary 2006) is contributed by not only the low information level in managerial narratives, but 
also the more negative tone in their disclosures on conference calls. To validate my sample, I 
reconcile my results with Hilary (2006) which indicates that unionized firms have greater 
information asymmetry. I find similar results that show labor unions are positively related to the 
information asymmetry measures – negatively related to analyst coverage and trading volume 
while positively related to bid-ask spread.  
I acknowledge that this research does not necessarily require that unions have a direct 
involvement in corporate disclosures, in this case, conference calls. Instead, this paper aims to 
show initial evidence that subtle linguistic attributes in managerial disclosures could reflect labor 
unions’ presence and influence. Such findings will also suggest that managers respond rationally 
to unions’ rent extraction, risk aversion, and monitoring behaviors.  
Prior literature shows the effects of labor unions on firm disclosure and information 
environment (e.g. Chung et al. 2015; Hilary 2006). For example, using data from South Korea, 
Chung et al. (2015) find that disclosure frequency is lower in firms with stronger labor unions. 
Bova et al. (2014) indicate that such firms tend to provide poorer and less frequent management 
forecasts, fewer conference calls, and low quality annual reports. My study differs from these 
papers in that it takes a closer look at the disclosure language itself by using a less boilerplate 
and richer disclosure channel (i.e. conference call) which provides more complex information as 
well as more cues, making managers’ intentional choices behind disclosure easier to observe. It 
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aims to draw explicit conclusions regarding whether and how unionized firms preserve 
information asymmetry through analyzing nuanced linguistic elements (i.e. information 
components, obfuscation components, and tones), as opposed to measuring the quality of certain 
disclosure items in a broad way. In other words, this research complements Hilary’s (2006) 
findings on the positive relation between labor union strength and information asymmetry by 
identifying specific linguistic mechanisms via which information asymmetry of unionized firms 
becomes greater.  
This study extends the literature that shows firms react to unions’ rent extraction by 
hiding information and resources. For example, firms with strong unions tend to hold less cash 
(Klasa et al. 2009) and withhold information (Chung et al. 2015; Hilary 2006). Therefore, this 
paper contributes to this line of research by fostering a better understanding of how managers 
make the most of disclosure language to maximize their interests in the presence of strong labor 
unions.  
Finally, this paper advances the stream of literature regarding conference calls and 
managerial disclosures. Most research on information disclosures employs the presence of 
certain disclosure items or the quality of disclosures using indices (e.g., Kelton and Yang 2008; 
Robbins and Austin 1986). However, the present study adds to a growing stream of empirical 
research on using linguistic measures constructed from conference calls to explore managerial 
intentions.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the background and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample, key variables and descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 provides the research design and main results. Section 5 displays the additional 
analyses, and Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1. Conference call and linguistic attributes 
There exists a long stream of literature on earnings conference calls which become 
increasingly popular in recent years. They are one of the most important tools firms employ to 
convey financial and non-financial messages (e.g. Brown et al. 2018).  
Conference calls normally include two parts: managers’ presentation and Q&A. This 
disclosure channel provides incremental information beyond that is presented in the 
corresponding quarterly report or press release for several reasons. First, conference calls offer 
additional cues (e.g. natural language, verbal cues, and interaction opportunity). Chafe and 
Tannen (1987) argue that spoken word presents tone, emotion, and greater language variety 
relative to written languages. Second, existing literature suggests that conference calls contain 
more complex information, (Kimrough and Louis 2011; Matsumoto et al. 2011; Skinner 2019). 
A recent study documents that managers place complex information in rich disclosure channels, 
such as conference calls, to achieve maximum communication efficiency (Skinner 2019). In 
addition, conference calls are subject to lower risk of legal liability (Frankel et al. 1999), making 
statements less formal. Consequently, managers are willing to provide incremental information, 
such as forward-looking statements and detailed segment data, during conference calls than to 
include them in the press release directly, especially when they are unsure of the market’s 
informational demand (Frankel et al. 1999; Jung et al. 2018; Miller and Skinner 2015). Because 
of these unique features of conference calls, analysts and stakeholders are interested in 




Recent literature examines topics (Gomez et al. 2018) and linguistic features during 
conference calls, such as tones (Chen et al. 2018), non-plain English (Brochet et al. 2016), 
contrastive words (Palmon et al. 2016), and spontaneity (Lee 2015). For example, using textual 
analysis, Matsumoto et al. (2011) find that managers provide less financial information and more 
forward-looking disclosures when firm performance is unsatisfactory. Brochet et al. (2018) show 
that managers from ethnic groups that have a more individualistic culture often talk 
optimistically, present greater self-reference, and offer fewer apologies in their disclosures. 
Moreover, Blau et al. (2015) and Price et al. (2012) document that linguistic tones can predict 
abnormal returns and trading volume.  
A long-standing literature has examined financial reports to measure their complexity. 
These studies mainly focus on annual reports (i.e. 10-K) and use the Fog measure to proxy for 
narrative readability (e.g. De Franco et al. 2012; Li 2008). The idea behind this readability 
measure is that regulators argue that corporate reports should be easy to understand for users in 
order to decrease information processing costs. Building on this assumption, researchers have 
widely used the Fog measure to capture reporting quality and find that more complex disclosure 
is related to greater analyst forecast dispersion and lower accuracy (Lehavy et al. 2011) as well 
as less trading by retail investors (Loughran and McDonalds 2010).  
However, this complexity measure has also caused controversy. On the one hand, high 
disclosure complexity has been perceived as intentional obfuscation (Li 2008). Li (2008) 
indicates that managers purposefully convey messages in a complex manner in order to hide bad 
news. Leuz and Wysocki (2016) also show that managers use discretion both to inform and to 
obfuscate since they need to strike a balance between the benefits of enhanced disclosure and the 
costs of sending information to competitors. In addition, they suggest that managers obfuscate to 
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engage in self-interested activities. Prior studies show that the main strategy to legally obscure 
information is to bury the awkward revelation in an overwhelming amount of uninformative text 
and data (e.g. Leuz and Wysochi 2016; Loughran and McDonald 2016). On the other hand, 
complex language could represent necessary information regarding firms’ complex business 
environments (Bloomfield 2008; Bushee et al. 2018). Firms with advanced technologies or 
sophisticated line of operations tend to involve more complex disclosures because of the 
fundamental nature. Therefore, it is important to identify the underlying information element and 
obfuscation element from the existing complexity measure (i.e. Fog) in order to properly 
evaluate reporting quality and capture managerial intentions behind firm disclosures.3 
To solve this problem, Bushee et al. (2018) use conference call transcripts and take the 
linguistic complexity of analysts as a benchmark to identify the portion of managerial linguistic 
complexity caused by obfuscation and the portion caused by information. Unlike mandatory 
disclosures (e.g. 10-K) that have been identified as problematic because of the use of 
“boilerplate” (e.g. Hoogervorst 2013), the language on conference calls reflects less boilerplate 
language and presents managers’ disclosure strategies more directly (e.g. Bushee et al. 2018). 
Using these unique features of conference calls, Bushee et al. (2018) show that the information 
element of managerial narratives is negatively related to information asymmetry, while the 
obfuscation element is positively related to information asymmetry.  
2.2. Labor union and information disclosure 
Labor union strength is widely used as a proxy for the influence of workers on firm 
decisions, since unions are better able to organize group actions (e.g. strikes) and exert pressure 
on management (e.g. Faleye et al. 2006; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Prevost et al. 2012). Ample 
 
3 Appendix B provides examples of intentional obfuscation and informative disclosure. 
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studies have examined the effects of labor unions (e.g. Bova et al. 2014; Faleye et al. 2006; 
Hamm et al. 2018; Hilary 2006). Because unions use the threat of a strike to extract quasi-rents 
from firms, labor unions are perceived as rent-seekers (Baldwin 1983; Grout 1984). As a result, 
managers facing a strong labor union employ various strategies to shelter firm resources to gain 
an advantage during collective bargaining. For example, Bronars and Deere (1991) suggest that 
firms improve their bargaining power over unions by issuing more debt. These firms also tend to 
hold less cash (Klasa et al. 2009), cut dividends (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991), and 
strategically choose accounting methods (Bowen et al. 1995). Relatedly, D’Souza et al. (2001) 
indicate that firms also engage in earnings management to gain bargaining advantages. In a 
similar vein, Hamm et al. (2018) find that managers smooth earnings to obtain a balance between 
sheltering resources from employees’ profit-sharing demands and catering to employees’ 
aversion to downside risks. They show that union strength is positively associated with earnings 
smoothing activities through both accruals and R&D expenditures.  
Besides labor unions’ impact on corporate strategic policies, another stream of research 
questions whether firms’ information disclosures reflect unions’ existence. In the absence of 
costs or uncertainty, firms should fully disclose their information to the public. However, 
managers face competing incentives to disclose or conceal information (Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Verrecchia 2001). Low information asymmetry can benefit a firm in various ways, such as 
increasing firm value (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Verrecchia 2001). Yet, such benefits from 
voluntary revelation of information come at a cost that arises from the proprietary nature of 
information, thus preventing full disclosure (Verrecchia 2001). One example of such costs that 
eventually lead to firms’ incentive to preserve information asymmetry is that stakeholders (e.g. 
employees) use disclosures to gain bargaining power and extract rents from firms.  
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Unions can bargain more effectively if they are more informed (Kleiner and Bouillon 
1988). However, they do not possess employers’ all the information regarding production, 
personnel, and financial situations (Brown 2000; Leap 1991). Throughout the history, unions 
have been actively seeking firms’ information and business records upon which corporate 
strategic decisions are based on. For example, during the 3-month strike at General Motors 
Corp., the United Auto Workers demanded to “see the books” to determine if the company was 
able to increase the wage. Furthermore, General Motors Corp. suspended its earnings guidance 
as a strategy to gain more leverage in its negotiation with the labor union in 2005. Thus, 
withholding or misrepresenting a firm’s true position is an inevitable choice during labor 
negotiations (Reynolds et al. 1998). In sum, labor unions impose additional costs on firms’ full 
disclosure, providing firms with an incentive to offer less information. As a result, firms with 
strong labor unions adopt various strategies when deciding whether, when, and how much 
information to disclose.  
Corroborative findings have also been shown in academic research. Scott (1994) 
illustrates that firms with a high likelihood of work stoppages or high salaries tend to provide 
less pension-related disclosure. Relatedly, Hilary (2006) argues that unionized firms are more 
likely to increase information asymmetry to gain bargaining power. Specifically, he shows that 
strong organized labor is associated with greater information asymmetry, measured by higher 
bid-ask spread, higher probability of informed trading, lower trading volume, and lower analyst 
coverage. However, he does not investigate the direct linguistic mechanism or disclosure channel 
that brings about the greater information asymmetry of unionized firms. In a similar spirit, 
Chung et al. (2015) demonstrate that the management’s disclosure frequency is negatively 
related to the firm’s labor union strength using data from South Korea. Bova et al. (2014) also 
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confirm that managers provide less disclosure when negotiating with employees and suggest that 
employee ownership mitigates this effect.  
2.3. Hypotheses Development 
Taken together, as the influence of unions and their ability to extract profits increase, 
managers are expected to have stronger incentives to hide information and obfuscate. Based on 
the preceding findings and arguments, I formulate the following two hypotheses: 
H1: Managers of firms with stronger labor unions present lower information level 
of linguistic complexity on earnings conference calls. 
 
H2a: Managers of firms with stronger labor unions present higher obfuscation 
level of linguistic complexity on earnings conference calls. 
 
In hypothesizing about the relation between labor union strength and the obfuscation 
level in voluntary disclosure, I also consider another scenario that leads to an opposite prediction. 
The obfuscation hypothesis (e.g Courtis 1998) suggests that managers mainly use ambiguous 
language to obscure bad news (e.g. Bloomfield 2008; Brennan et al. 2009; Li 2008; Smith and 
Taffler 1992; Subramanian et al. 1993). However, Bova (2013) and Chung et al. (2015) find that 
managers facing strong labor unions are motivated to be forthcoming about negative news and 
tend to release such information in a timely manner in order to preserve their bargaining power 
in labor negotiations. These firms even deliberately create negative signals by not walking 
forecasts downward when estimates are too high and by managing earnings downward when 
estimates are too low (Bova 2013). Given these arguments, it is possible that firms with stronger 
labor unions have fewer incentives to obfuscate, leading to the hypothesis: 
H2b: Managers of firms with stronger labor unions present lower obfuscation 
level of linguistic complexity on earnings conference calls. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize that corporate decisions are the outcome of a 
bargaining process among all stakeholders. In this regard, this paper is an attempt to foster a 
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deeper understanding on how powerful stakeholders (i.e. unionized workers) affect managerial 
language in voluntary disclosures. In terms of the association between labor unions and 
managers’ linguistic attributes, little research exists that speaks directly to my line of inquiry. 
This study differs from prior literature (e.g. Bova et al. 2014; Chung et al. 2015) in that it uses a 
less boilerplate and richer communication channel which provides more complex information as 
well as cues, making managers’ intentional choices more observable. Furthermore, this paper 
disentangles the underlying information and obfuscation components of reporting complexity so 
that it can properly evaluate the disclosure quality and capture managers’ intentions behind 
disclosures in the presence of labor unions. In sum, this paper aims to analyze nuanced linguistic 
elements and shed light on how managers strategically use disclosure language to maximize their 
interests in the face of strong labor unions.  
3. Sample, key variables and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Sample selection 
 Table 1 provides details regarding sample selection. The linguistic data is constructed 
using conference call transcripts retrieved from Thomson Reuters StreetEvents. The first labor 
union measure (Union) utilizes the data from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. 
Another labor union proxy (UnionDummy) is based on DirectEdgar 10-K filings data.4 I also 
construct my sample using the information on analysts from IBES, stock returns from CRSP, and 
accounting items from Compustat. The sample period runs from 2002 to 2017, consisting of 
59,184 firm-quarters. I begin the sample in 2002 because it is the first year that conference call 
 
4 I gratefully acknowledge the conference call data and the labor union measure (UnionDummy) from Bushee et al. 
(2018) and Hamm et al. (2018), respectively. 
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transcripts became available in StreetEvents. All continuous variables are winsorized at their top 
and bottom 1% distributions.  
3.2. Key variables 
3.2.1 Linguistic measures 
Gunning (1952) Fog index is used to estimate linguistic complexity. It involves two 
factors – the number of words and the percent of complex words5.  
 Fog = 0.4 × (average number of words per sentence + percent of complex words)          
Higher value of Fog indicates more complex text. This index refers to the hypothetical 
years of education needed to fully understand the text. Using this Fog index, managerial 
linguistic complexity (i.e. Fog(Manager)) is measured for the presentation and Q&A sessions of 
conference calls. Fog(Analyst) refers to the complexity of analysts’ language during the Q&A 
session. Bushee et al. (2018) show that a manager’s linguistic complexity is determined by two 
factors – the intrinsic amount of information and intentional obfuscation. Thus, managerial 
linguistic complexity (i.e. Fog(Manager)) is represented as follows: 
Fog(Manager) = β0 + β1Info + β2Obfu + ε                                                                        (1) 
 
Using the linguistic complexity of analysts on conference calls, I then estimate the latent 
variables of Fog(Manager) – information (Info) and obfuscation (Obfu). Underlying this 
methodology developed by Bushee et al. (2018) is the assumption that managers have incentives 
to obscure information while analysts do not have such incentives since they aim to uncover 
relevant and essential information on the calls (Matsumoto et al. 2011; Mayew 2008; Twedt and 
Rees 2012). Thus, the linguistic complexity of analysts serves as a complexity benchmark when 
there is no obfuscation force involved. This methodology is presented as follows: 
 
5 Complex words refer to those with more than two syllables. 
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Fog(Manager) = β0 + β1Fog(Analyst) + ε                                                                         (2) 
 
The fitted value of model (2) is the estimated information component (Info) and the 
residual is the estimated obfuscation component (Obfu). Bushee et al. (2018) indicate that these 
two components affect information asymmetry in different directions. Stated differently, the 
latent information element is negatively related to information asymmetry whereas the latent 
obfuscation element is positively related to information asymmetry. 
 Following Bushee et al. (2018), I add control variables regarding firm complexity to 
model (2) and use the following empirical model to estimate the latent components (i.e. Obfu and 
Info) that will be used in my study. Fog(Present) and Fog(QA) refer to managers’ linguistic 
complexity during the presentation session and Q&A session, respectively. I include variables 
regarding firm complexity such as firm size (Size) that is related to disclosure practices (e.g. 
Lang and Lundholm 1996), book-to-market ratio (BM) that captures firms’ growth potentials 
(e.g. Brochet et al. 2016; Bushee et al. 2003), and leverage (Leverage) that controls for 
managerial incentives when firms have high levels of debt and agency costs (Frankel et al. 
1999). I also include stock returns (Returns), capital intensity (CapIntensity), research and 
development (R&D), acquisitions (Acquisitions), capital expenditure (Capex), debt and equity 
issuance (Financing), cash flow volatility (σCFO), goodwill impairments (Goodwill), and 
restructuring charge (Restructure). In addition, I include number of analysts (Analyst) to capture 
the variations driven by informational demand. See Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.  
Fog(Present) (or Fog(QA)) = β0 + β1Fog(Analyst) + β2Size + β3Leverage + β4BM  
              + β5Returns + β6Acquisitions + β7CapIntensity + β8Capex 
                                                         + β9R&D + β10Financing + β11σCFO + β12Goodwill  
                                                         + β13Restructure + ε,                                                            (3)    
 
The fitted values are used as the estimated values of the latent information components 
(i.e. InfoPres and InfoQA), and the residual values are the estimated values of the latent 
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obfuscation components (i.e. ObfuPres and ObfuQA). The results are reported in Table 2. The 
table shows that analysts’ linguistic complexity (Fog(Analyst)) is positively and significantly 
related to managers’ linguistic complexity in both the presentation (Fog(Present)) and Q&A 
(Fog(QA)) sessions. The coefficient on Fog(Analyst) is smaller in the Fog(Present) regression 
compared to the coefficient in the Fog(QA) regression (0.18 vs. 0.53), supported by the fact that 
managerial presentation is prepared well in advance and offered at the beginning of the call 
while Fog(Analyst) is more important in determining managers’ linguistic complexity in the 
response. The results are similar with Bushee et al. (2018). 
 In addition, Table 2 shows that managers tend to use more complex language during 
presentation in firms that are smaller and have higher leverage, lower returns, more acquisitions, 
lower capital intensity, more R&D investment, more financing activity, and greater cash flow 
volatility. Table 2 also indicates that managers use more complex language during Q&A sessions 
if their firms have lower capital intensity, higher capital expenditure, more R&D investment, 
more financing activity, and higher cash flow volatility. The sign differences between these two 
regressions suggest that the model captures managers’ linguistic choices in different portions of 
the call, instead of presenting a consistent linear combination of variables.  
 The adjusted R-squared of the model for managers’ response (19.87%) is larger than the 
one for presentation (10.60%), consistent with the fact that analyst language has more influence 
on managerial language in the Q&A session. Of note, the adjusted R-squareds are relatively low. 
However, these results are similar with prior studies on textual analysis. For example, Bushee et 
al. (2018) present adjusted R-squareds of 2.2% to 14.3%. Li (2008) shows adjusted R-squareds 
of 6% to 8%.  
3.2.2. Labor union measures 
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 I use two measures to capture a firm’s labor strength. Following Hilary (2006), the first 
measure (Union) is the product of labor intensity (i.e. the number of employees scaled by total 
assets) and unionization rate (i.e. the percentage of unionized employees in the industry) that is 
retrieved from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. This database provides 
information on labor union membership and coverage by industry. Prior accounting and finance 
research has used this proxy extensively (e.g. Chen et al. 2011; Chung et al. 2015; Hamm et al. 
2018; Hilary 2006; Klasa et al. 2009). Since the unionization rate can be used as a proxy for the 
degree of bargaining, such pressure from labor unions brings threats to not only the 
corresponding firms, but also all the other firms in the industry. Even though all firms in the 
same industry are under a comparable pressure from labor unions, the impact on a specific firm 
is determined by firm characteristics. Thus, I interact the industry-level unionization rate with the 
firm-level labor intensity which measures whether employees have significant effects on 
managers’ decisions. This proxy of union strength is for every firm-year since the data is updated 
annually.  
 Following Hamm et al. (2018), I use another proxy for firm-level unionization 
(UnionDummy) that suggests the existence of labor unions based on textual analysis of 10-K 
filings. It is constructed using keywords and phrases regarding the existence or non-existence of 
a labor union, such as “union”, “collective(ly) bargain”, and “labor/employee/worker 
organization”. First, all these keywords and phrases are collected by randomly reading items 1 
and 1A. Then, these search terms are applied to the full sample. Specifically, UnionDummy 
equals zero for those firm-years with no keywords in 10-K filings. For those contain the search 
terms, further examination is conducted to identify expressions that explicitly indicate non-
existence of a labor union. These firm-years are set to zero. Examples of those terms are as 
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follows: 1) No current U.S.-based employees are unionized; 2) None of our labor force is 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. If these non-existence expressions are 
accompanied by a specific location, they will not be counted as non-existence. The examples are 
as follows: 1) We have no unionized employees in Europe; 2) None of our employees in Mexico 
are unionized. For the remaining subsample, which contains union expressions but no non-
existence indicators, UnionDummy is set to one. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 Panel A of Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of the variables that are used to test the 
two hypotheses. It shows that sample firms are large (mean Size = 7.26) and receive high analyst 
coverage (mean = 9.13).  Union has a mean value of 0.04. UnionDummy has a mean of 0.39, 
suggesting that about 39 percent of the sample firms have labor unions. Fog(Present) has a mean 
of 15.53, which is higher than the mean of Fog(QA) (12.01). This difference means that 
managers use more sophisticated words in the presentation session of the call compared to the 
Q&A session. It can be explained by the fact that the presentation scripts on conference calls are 
carefully constructed and vetted by departments such as investor relations and legal counsel 
whereas the response by managers tends to be more spontaneous and casual (e.g. Brown et al. 
2018). These statistics are generally consistent with prior studies (Bushee et al. 2018; Hamm et 
al. 2018; Hilary 2006). 
 Panel B of Table 3 reports correlations among variables. Pearson (Spearman) correlations 
appear below (above) the diagonal. These results are also similar with previous literature 
(Bushee et al. 2018; Hamm et al. 2018). Specifically, the Pearson correlation between ObfuPres 
and ObfuQA is 0.33, indicating that managers adopt different strategies to obfuscate in the 
presentation and the response. The Pearson correlation between InfoPres and InfoQA is 0.71, 
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consistent with the fact that the information components are mainly determined by the 
fundamental nature of firm complexity. There are no significant correlations between Info(.) and 
Obfu(.). Panel B also shows a significant and positive correlation between Union and 
UnionDummy (0.16 for the Pearson correlation), suggesting that these two union proxies 
represent similar but different constructs. As for the correlations between the linguistic measures 
(i.e. Obfu(.) and Info(.)) and union variables (i.e. Union and UnionDummy), the table shows that 
they are negatively and significantly correlated with each other. For example, the correlation 
between ObfuPres and Union is -0.08, whereas the correlation between InfoPres and Union is -
0.13. The negative correlations between the latent linguistic components and union variables 
provide preliminary support for H1 and H2b. In addition, the differences in these correlations 
suggest that labor union strength represents much of the variation in the information component, 
compared to the obfuscation component. 
4. Research design and main results 
4.1. Test of H1 (information component of linguistic complexity): 
H1 predicts that managers of firms with stronger labor unions tend to present lower 
information level of linguistic complexity on conference calls. I regress InfoPres and InfoQA 
separately on the firm-level labor union variable (Union or UnionDummy), controlling for firm 
complexity: firm size (Size), leverage (Leverage), book-to-market ratio to capture growth 
potentials (BM), stock performance (Returns), acquisitions (Acquisitions), capital intensity 
(CapIntensity), capital expenditures (Capex), research and development (R&D), debt and equity 
issuance (Financing), cash flow volatility (σCFO), goodwill impairments (Goodwill), 
restructuring charges (Restructuring), analyst following (Analyst), sales growth (SGROW), and 
loss indicator (Loss). These control variables are commonly used in prior literature to control for 
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firm complexity (e.g. Barth et al. 2001; Bushee et al. 2018). In addition, I include industry and 
fiscal quarter fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the firm level. I expect to find that firms 
with more acquisitions (Acquisitions), more R&D investment (R&D), and high cash flow 
volatility (σCFO) will disclose more information components. For the remaining control 
variables, I am uncertain of their signs of coefficients.  
InfoPres (or InfoQA) = β0 + β1Union (or UnionDummy) + β2Size + β3Leverage + β4BM  
                                  + β5Returns + β6Acquisitions + β7CapIntensity + β8Capex + β9R&D  
                                  + β10Financing + β11σCFO + β12Goodwill + β13Restructure + ε,   (4) 
where all the variables are defined in Appendix A. If stronger labor unions are associated with 
lower information level in managerial disclosures (H1), then β1 will be negative and significant. 
 Table 4 reports results from model (4). I estimate regressions separately for the 
presentation and Q&A sessions of conference calls. Both labor union strength measures (i.e. 
Union in Panel A and UnionDummy in Panel B) show negative and significant coefficients on 
the information component of linguistic complexity for the presentation sessions of the call 
(InfoPres), while present negative but not significant coefficients for the Q&A portions of the 
call (InfoQA). These results are consistent with the fact that the presentation scripts on 
conference calls are carefully constructed considering all stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling 
1976), while the managers’ response in the Q&A session is relatively more spontaneous and 
driven by analysts’ language. To avoid the risks of accidentally revealing private information, 
managers strategically circumvent the interactive nature of conference calls through biasing the 
participant selection by only allowing favorable analysts to ask questions (Mayew 2008) or 
intentionally ignoring sensitive questions (Hollander et al. 2010). Overall, H1 is supported by the 
findings, suggesting that firms with stronger labor unions tend to disclose lower information 
level of linguistic complexity. Bushee et al. (2018) indicate that information components 
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contribute to better information environment. Thus, my results suggest that higher information 
asymmetry of unionized firms (e.g. Hilary 2006) is contributed by the lower information level in 
managerial narratives on conference calls. 
4.2. Test of H2 (obfuscation component of linguistic complexity): 
 H2a (H2b) suggests that managers of unionized firms tend to present higher (lower) 
obfuscation level of linguistic complexity on earnings conference calls. OLS regression for H2 is 
similar with model (4), with ObfuPres and ObfuQA in place of InfoPres and InfoQA, 
respectively. Following prior literature (e.g. Bushee et al. 2018; Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015; 
Skinner 2019), the variables I use to control for reporting incentives are firm size (Size), firm 
leverage (Leverage), book-to-market ratio (BM), stock returns (Returns), research and 
development (R&D), goodwill impairments (Goodwill), negative earnings (Loss), industry 
concentration (HHI), special items (SpecItems), analyst coverage (Analyst), analyst dispersion 
(Dispersion), earnings surprise (Surprise), and an indicator for whether the firm meets or beats 
analyst forecasts by a penny or less (SmallBeat). H2a suggests that β1 is positive and significant 
while H2b hypothesizes the opposite. 
ObfuPres (or ObfuQA) = β0 + β1Union (or UnionDummy) + β2Size + β3Leverage + β4BM  
                                     + β5Returns + β6R&D + β7Goodwill + β8Loss + β9HHI  
                                     + β10SpecItems + β11Analyst + β12Dispersion + β13Surprise  
                                     + β14SmallBeat + ε                                                                        (5) 
  
Table 5 reports the results of model (5). Panel A shows that Union is negatively related to 
the obfuscation level of linguistic complexity in both the presentation and Q&A portions of the 
call, while the coefficient is statistically significant for the presentation sessions. Panel B also 
presents that UnionDummy is negatively related to the obfuscation level in both the presentation 
and Q&A portions, while the coefficient is statistically significant for the Q&A portions. Overall, 
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these results support H2b which indicates that firms with stronger labor unions tend to present 
lower obfuscation level of linguistic complexity. 
5. Additional tests 
5.1. Subsample tests 
 Based on the obfuscation hypothesis (Bloomfield 2008; Courtis 1998) which suggests 
that managers mainly use misleading or ambiguous language to diffuse bad news (e.g. Brennan 
et al. 2009; Li 2008), unionized firms should have fewer incentives to obfuscate because they are 
more upfront about bad news to preserve their bargaining power in labor negotiations (Bova 
2013; Chung et al. 2015), presented as H2b. To confirm this argument, I conduct analysis to test 
whether labor unions influence the managers’ obfuscation level in their narratives differently in 
the positive tone setting versus the negative tone setting. Specifically, in each conference call 
session (i.e. presentation and Q&A), I create a variable, Tone(.). It is calculated as the difference 
between the number of positive tone words and negative tone words, scaled by the total number 
of these tone words in the corresponding session. Then, I create two subsamples: a positive tone 
group if Tone(.) is greater than the industry average tone of managers, and a negative tone group 
if Tone(.) is lower than the industry average tone of managers. I expect to observe that the 
negative association between Obfu(.) and union measures (i.e. Union and UnionDummy) is 
stronger in the negative tone subsample, whereas it is weaker in the positive tone subsample. 
 The results of the subsample tests are presented in Table 6. Tests of the differences in the 
coefficients on Union across Panel A (i.e. positive tone group) and Panel B (i.e. negative tone 
group) indicate that the negative relation between union strength and the obfuscation level is 
significantly stronger in the negative tone group regarding the presentation sessions, while no 
significant differences between the two subsamples regarding the Q&A sessions. I find similar 
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results when using UnionDummy as an alternative measure for union strength (Panel C and Panel 
D). These results are still consistent with the fact that the presentation on conference calls are 
scripted considering all stakeholders and relevant parties (Jensen and Meckling 1976), while the 
managers’ response in the Q&A session is more spontaneous and driven by analysts’ questions. 
These findings provide evidence that strategic obfuscation of negative news is more likely for 
firms with a weaker labor union, since strong unionized firms tend to be forthcoming about 
negative information to gain bargaining power. Overall, the results in Table 6 are consistent with 
my expectation that the negative association between obfuscation and union strength is stronger 
in the negative tone subsample. These tests also offer a deeper understanding regarding the 
obfuscation hypothesis and suggest that firms could have different strategies when disclosing 
negative information, instead of simply obscuring bad news. 
5.2. Tone and labor unions 
Building on the arguments suggested by prior studies that firms with strong labor unions 
are more likely to send negative signals (e.g. Bova 2013), I next investigate whether managers of 
unionized firms tend to use negative tone on conference calls. Tone is a crucial component of 
language, especially because managers might exploit the tone in their narratives for various 
purposes, such as gaining negotiation advantage over labor unions. Research shows that firms 
actively project a negative picture to better cope with employees’ demands. Bova (2013) 
documents that unionized firms tend to miss earnings forecasts deliberately to signal negative 
outlooks to their unions. They are also more willing to employ conservative accounting methods 
and deflate earnings intentionally (Bowen et al. 1995; Chyz et al. 2013; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
1991; D’Souza et al. 2001). In addition, Chung et al. (2015) demonstrate that managers facing 
stronger labor unions tend to withhold positive news but release bad news in a timely manner.  
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Following the established findings above, I investigate the relation between labor strength 
and linguistic tones in this section. Positive(.) (Negative(.)) refers to the number of positive 
(negative) tone words in the respective portion of the conference call (Loughran and McDonald 
2011). The word lists developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) are designed specifically for 
financial disclosures and have been extensively used in both accounting and finance research 
(e.g. Bushee et al. 2018; Davis et al. 2015). I analyze the effects of labor unions on managers’ 
tones during conference calls using the following regression specifications. Each tone variable 
(i.e. Positive (.) and Negative (.)) is regressed on industry and fiscal quarter fixed effects as well 
as firm clustering, while adding control variables that have been widely used in prior literature 
(e.g. Davis et al. 2015; Skinner 2019). I predict that managers of strong unionized firms have 
incentives to use more negative tone in the narratives. 
Positive (.) (or Negative (.)) = β0 + β1Union (or UnionDummy) + β2HHI + β3Size  
                                             + β4BM + β5Returns + β6Earnings + β7EARN_sd + β8Age 
                                             + β9Capex + β10R&D + β11Loss + ε,                                    (6) 
 
 Panel A of Table 7 shows that Union has no statistically significant relation to Positive 
(.), in both the presentation and Q&A sessions. Using the alternative union measure, Panel B 
presents similar results regarding the relation between UnionDummy and Positive (.). These 
results suggest that union strength has no effects on strategically using positive words on 
conference calls. Panel C and Panel D present the relation between union strength and negative 
tone. The coefficients of union strength measures (i.e. Union and UnionDummy) on Negative (.) 
are all positive and significant, except the coefficient of Union in the presentation portions of the 
call. Overall, these results indicate that managers of strong unionized firms tend to deliberately 
use more negative words on conference calls. Prior literature shows that negative tone 
contributes to higher information asymmetry (e.g. Bushee et al. 2018). Thus, the higher 
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information asymmetry of unionized firms (e.g. Hilary 2006) is not only contributed by the lower 
information level in managerial narratives, but also contributed by the more negative tone in 
their disclosures on conference calls. 
5.3. Hilary (2006) replication 
To prove the validity of my data, such as selection bias, I reconcile my results with Hilary 
(2006) which shows the positive relation between labor union strength and information asymmetry. 
I replicate his study by using three proxies of information asymmetry which he uses – bid-ask 
spread, analyst coverage, and trading volume. Using my sample, I follow the methodology of 
Hilary (2006) and employ various combination of control variables in the regression specifications: 
indicator variable that equals one if the stock is traded on the NASDAQ (NASD) since prior studies 
(e.g. Bessembinder and Kaufman 1997; Huang and Stoll 1996) show that these firms are associated 
with greater information asymmetry, firm size (Size), standard deviation of the daily returns to 
measure return volatility (ReturnSD), book-to-market ratio (BM), firm leverage (Leverage), a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is a bond rating by Standard and Poor’s in the 
Compustat database (Rating), return on assets (ROA), industry concentration (HHI), analyst 
coverage (Analyst), and bid-ask spread (Spread). Also, I account for industry and year fixed effects 
which capture the variations over time and across industries. Consistent with Hilary (2006), I 
expect to find that labor unions are positively related to these information asymmetry measures – 
positively related to bid-ask spread while negatively related to analyst coverage and trading 
volume.  
Spread = β0 + β1Union + β2Analyst + β3NASD + β4Size + β5ReturnSD + β6BM + β7Leverage  
            + β8Rating + β9ROA + β10HHI + ε                                                                        (7) 
 
Analyst = β0 + β1Union + β2Spread + β3NASD + β4Size + β5ReturnSD + β6BM  




Volume = β0 + β1Union + β2Spread + β3NASD + β4Size + β5ReturnSD + β6BM  
             + β7Leverage + β8Rating + β9ROA + β10HHI + ε                                                 (9) 
The results of  estimating these models are presented in Table 8. When the dependent 
variable is Spread (Panel A), the coefficient for Union is positive and significant. This result 
suggests that firms with stronger labor unions tend to have higher bid-ask spread, in other words, 
higher information asymmetry. When the dependent variable is Analyst (Panel B), the coefficient 
for Union is negative and significant, indicating lower analyst coverage when a firm has a 
stronger labor union. Similarly, Panel C shows a negative and significant coefficient of Union on 
Volume, suggesting that firms with stronger labor unions have lower trade volume which is a 
proxy for higher information asymmetry. Overall, using the dataset of firms with conference call 
transcripts available, the results in Table 8 are consistent with those found in Hilary (2006), 
confirming that unionized firms tend to have higher information asymmetry.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I use the conference call setting to observe managers’ linguistic attributes in 
relation to their labor union strength. By disentangling the two latent components of linguistic 
complexity (i.e. obfuscation and information), I examine how unionized firms organize their 
language to maximize their interests under the influence of strong labor unions. I find that 
managers of firms with stronger labor unions tend to present lower information level of linguistic 
complexity on earnings conference calls as well as lower obfuscation level of linguistic 
complexity. I also show that the negative association between the obfuscation component and 
union measures is driven by the negative tone subsample, offering a deeper understanding 
regarding the obfuscation hypothesis. 
In addition, I find that unionized firms are more likely to use negative tone in their 
disclosures, consistent with previous literature that argues unionized firms tend to send negative 
29 
 
outlooks to discourage employees’ demands (Bova 2013; Chung et al. 2015). Overall, these 
results suggest that the high information asymmetry of unionized firms (e.g. Hilary 2006) is 
contributed by both the low information level in managerial narratives, and the more negative 
tone in their disclosures on conference calls. Finally, I validate my sample by replicating Hilary 
(2006) to make sure the data does not suffer from severe selection bias.  
This study takes a closer look at the disclosure language itself and analyzes the nuanced 
linguistic elements using a rich communication channel – earnings conference calls.  It 
contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper investigates disclosures from the 
linguistic perspective. Unlike previous studies (e.g. Bova 2013; Chung et al. 2015), this paper 
highlights the language itself as a reflection of the influence from labor unions by using a less 
boilerplate and richer disclosure channel (i.e. earnings conference call). By analyzing subtle 
linguistic elements and disentangling the latent components of reporting complexity, as opposed 
to measuring the disclosure quality in a broad and noisy way, this paper aims to properly 
evaluate the disclosure quality and capture managers’ intentional disclosure strategies in the 
presence of labor unions. It also responds to a call for research in textual analysis of disclosures 
(e.g. Li 2008) and adds to a growing stream of research on using linguistic measures to explore 
managerial intentions.  
Second, this paper extends the literature on how managers respond rationally to unions’ 
rent extraction, risk aversion, and monitoring behaviors (e.g. Chyz et al. 2013; Faleye et al. 
2006). It contributes to this line of research by fostering a better understanding of how managers 
formulate tactics and construct their disclosure language when facing strong labor unions. Lastly, 
this study offers fresh insights into how labor unions affect firms’ information asymmetry. 
Despite prior literature that argues the positive association between labor strength and 
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information asymmetry (e.g. Chung et al. 2015; Hilary 2006), it is still less understood how 
managers exploit their language to achieve high information asymmetry in the presence of strong 
labor unions. This study sheds light on the relation between labor union strength and information 
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Union Firm-level union membership measure based on the Current Population 
Survey, calculated as the industry-level percentage of union 
membership times the number of employees scaled by the beginning 
total assets. 
UnionDummy Firm-level union dummy variable that takes the value of one if a union 
exists at the firm level, zero otherwise. 
Fog(.) Fog index (i.e. linguistic complexity) of the respective portion of the 
earnings conference calls. Specifically, Fog(Analyst) is the Fog index of 
analysts during the Q&A session of the call. Fog(Present) refers to the 
Fog index of managers during the presentation session. Fog(Response) 
indicates the Fog index of managers during the Q&A session of the call. 
Obfu(.) Obfu(.) is the residual from model (3). Estimated latent obfuscation 
component, derived from Fog(.). ObfuPres indicates the obfuscation 
level of managers during the presentation session of the call. ObfuQA 
refers to the obfuscation level of managers during the Q&A session of 
the call.  
Info(.) Info(.) is the fitted value from model (3). Estimated latent information 
component, derived from Fog(.). InfoPres indicates the information 
level of managers during the presentation session of the call. InfoQA 
refers to the information level of managers during the Q&A session of 
the call.  
Positive(.) The number of positive tone words in the respective portion of the call 
(Loughran and McDonald 2011). 
Negative(.) The number of negative tone words in the respective portion of the call 
(Loughran and McDonald 2011). 
Tone(.) The difference between the number of positive tone words and negative 
tone words, scaled by the total number of positive tone words and 
negative tone words in the respective portion of the call. 
Spread Median of monthly bid-ask spread. 
Analyst Log of the number of analysts following. 
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Vol Median of monthly trading volume. 
Size Log of market value of equity.  
Leverage The sum of long term and short term debts scaled by total assets of the 
prior quarter. 
BM Book value of equity scaled by market value of equity of the prior 
quarter. 
Returns Buy-and-hold return over the quarter, in percent. 
Acquisitions Total acquisitions over the quarter scaled by total assets of the prior 
quarter. 
CapIntensity Net plant, property, and equipment scaled by total assets of the prior 
quarter. 
Capex Capital expenditures scaled by total assets of the prior quarter. 
R&D Research and development expense scaled by sales. 
Financing Amount raised from stock and debt issuances during the quarter scaled 
by total assets of the prior quarter. 
σCFO Standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets 
over the prior five years. 
Goodwill Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a goodwill 
impairment charge during the quarter, zero otherwise. 
Restructure Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a 
restructuring charge during the quarter, zero otherwise. 
Loss Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm reports a loss, 
zero otherwise. 
HHI Sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index within each SIC 2-digit 
industry. A higher value indicates a higher concentration, or less 
competition. 
SpecItems Special items scaled by market value of equity of the prior quarter. 
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Dispersion Standard deviation of analyst forecasts for the current quarter, measured 
prior to the conference call and scaled by price at the beginning of the 
quarter. 
Surprise Consensus forecast error scaled by market value of equity at the 
beginning of the quarter. Consensus forecast is the median analyst 
forecast on IBES measured prior to the conference call. 
SmallBeat Indicator variable for whether earnings per share beat consensus 
forecasts by a penny or less. 
Age Log of one plus the number of years of data in Compustat. 
Earnings Earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total asset of the prior 
quarter. 
EARN_sd Standard deviation of earnings scaled by total assets over the prior five 
years. 
NASD Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the stock is traded on 
NASDAQ, zero otherwise. 
ReturnSD Standard deviation of the daily returns. 
Rating Indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a bond rating by 
Standard and Poor’s, zero otherwise. 



















Q: “So, Walter, just in terms of that $1.5 
billion | all right, so you're not going to 
give me how much the plus is, but how 
much do you need to keep? Do you need to 
keep $500 million sitting there, do you need 
to keep $1 billion of it sitting there and 
never use it? How much do you need to 
keep?" 
 
A: “Listen, it's a great question. It's 
about situation driven and you evaluate it. 
As a definitional issue, you would say that 
you technically use the excess but you will 
assess it as you evaluate situation review at 
that particular time. On this particular-the 
way we look at it today, the excess is get- 
ting, as we moved out of the OD, certainly 
that will put less pressure on having any sort 
of contingent element within it. So, we are 
{ we evaluate it. At this stage I would say 
technically it's all usable. Then depending 
on when we go to use it, we will assess the 
environment and assess the best use of the 
shareholder and how quickly we can replen- 
ish. I think you know where the earnings 
are coming from, it's less capital intense. So 
that gives us capability and that all goes 
into the evaluation of it. That's why we talk 
about the plus, because you really do have-it 
changes the circumstances but certainly 





Q: “Good morning. I just wanted to fol- 
low up in regards to some of the questions 
around capital. Your CET1 ratio obviously 
appears to have very healthy and plenty of 
excess capital to be deployed over time, but 
it seems like your TCE ratio is relatively low 
compared to the peer group. Are you com- 
fortable bringing down the TCE ratio below 
7% as long as you have the CET1 ratio well 
above an 8% ratio?" 
 
A: “Kevin, it's Mac. So we are focused on 
CET1, and we do have an operating range 
of 9% to 10% for CET1. As you see, the 
9.5% which is where we are today 
calibrates, translates to a 7.2% TCE. We do 
monitor the tangible common ratio. It is 
something that we pay close attention to. I'm 
not sure I see it going below 7%, but it 
certainly is calibrated to CET1 and that's the 























   
Conference call data         169,008  
After merge with:  
                        Compustat         138,499  
                        CRSP         104,281  
                        IBES           87,946  
                        Labor union           87,942  
Less: missing key controls         (28,758) 
























Estimating the latent components of managers’ linguistic complexity 
 Fog (Present)  Fog(QA) 
Variable coeff. t-value  coeff. t-value 
Fog(Analyst) 0.179*** 18.54  0.528*** 30.64 
Size -0.118*** -7.29  -0.012 -0.97 
Leverage 0.469*** 4.39  0.079 0.89 
BM -0.092 -1.6  -0.067 -1.49 
Returns -0.002*** -4.09  0.000 -0.61 
Acquisitions 1.031*** 4.26  -0.118 -0.64 
CapIntensity -0.240* -1.65  -0.603*** -6.18 
Capex -0.710 -0.99  0.868** 2.01 
R&D 8.445*** 8.94  5.059*** 7.94 
Financing 0.145* 1.93  0.105* 1.8 
σCFO 1.215*** 5.7  0.571*** 3.52 
Goodwill 0.034 0.65  -0.045 -1.09 
Restructure -0.060 -1.39  -0.030 -0.87 
Firm & Time cluster                      Yes                      Yes 
Obs                   59,184                   59,184 
Adj R2 (%)                   10.60%                   19.87% 
Note: This table presents results from model (3) that estimates the latent components of managers’ linguistic 
complexity during the respective session of the earnings conference call. Fog(Present) refers to the linguistic 
complexity of managers during the presentation portion of the call. Fog(QA) refers to the linguistic complexity of 

















Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev P25 P50 P75 
Fog(Present) 59,184 15.525 1.517 14.530 15.526 16.518 
Fog(QA) 59,184 12.008 1.605 10.898 11.885 12.977 
Fog(Analyst) 59,184 9.333 1.239 8.489 9.218 10.051 
ObfuPres 59,184 0.001 1.423 -0.931 0.014 0.941 
ObfuQA 59,184 0.023 1.416 -0.959 -0.087 0.893 
InfoPres 59,184 15.521 0.447 15.221 15.442 15.721 
InfoQA 59,184 11.981 0.676 11.515 11.923 12.383 
Union  59,184 0.036 0.055 0.007 0.017 0.041 
UnionDummy 47,201 0.389 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Size 59,184 7.256 1.628 6.102 7.132 8.301 
Leverage 59,184 0.222 0.216 0.012 0.187 0.345 
BM 59,184 0.453 0.370 0.223 0.387 0.615 
Returns 59,184 2.854 22.931 -10.138 2.202 14.191 
Acqusitions 59,184 0.018 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.006 
CapIntensity 59,184 0.221 0.207 0.069 0.147 0.307 
Capex 59,184 0.026 0.031 0.007 0.016 0.033 
R&D 59,184 0.016 0.028 0.000 0.001 0.021 
Financing 59,184 0.102 0.212 0.002 0.015 0.090 
σCFO 59,184 0.071 0.093 0.023 0.041 0.075 
Goodwill 59,184 0.023 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Restructure 59,184 0.247 0.431 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Loss 59,184 0.267 0.442 0.000 0.000 1.000 
HHI 59,184 0.193 0.180 0.065 0.127 0.253 
SpecItems 59,184 -0.004 0.019 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
Analyst 59,184 9.132 6.336 4.000 7.000 12.000 
Dispersion 59,184 0.008 0.033 0.000 0.001 0.003 
Surprise 59,184 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Pearson and Spearman correlations 
Note: Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used to test the two hypotheses. Panel B shows the correlation coefficients. Pearson correlations are presented below 
the diagonal; Spearman correlations are presented above the diagonal. Boldface indicates significance at the 5% level. I winsorize all the continuous variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII
I Fog(Present) 0.38 0.13 0.95 0.33 0.29 0.20 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.16 -0.06 0.19 0.05 0.17 -0.01 -0.04 0.20 -0.22 -0.03 -0.08 0.13 -0.01 0.04
II Fog(QA) 0.36 0.42 0.30 0.90 0.34 0.45 -0.10 -0.13 0.00 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 0.14 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.14 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00
III Fog(Analyst) 0.15 0.41 -0.01 0.05 0.54 0.94 -0.06 -0.03 0.15 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.14 -0.05 -0.03 0.00
IV ObfuPres 0.96 0.30 0.00 0.33 0.03 0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.15 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.03
V ObfuQA 0.32 0.90 0.01 0.33 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
VI InfoPres 0.29 0.31 0.53 0.01 0.01 0.72 -0.24 -0.27 -0.46 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 0.01 -0.41 -0.20 0.53 0.13 0.45 0.01 -0.06 0.37 -0.24 -0.03 -0.22 0.24 0.03 0.06
VII InfoQA 0.21 0.44 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.71 -0.17 -0.14 0.07 -0.11 -0.20 -0.02 0.02 -0.27 -0.12 0.30 0.07 0.15 -0.01 0.08 0.11 -0.15 -0.04 0.13 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
VIII Union -0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.13 -0.09 0.26 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.34 0.24 -0.34 0.00 -0.13 0.02 0.01 -0.15 0.35 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.00
IX UnionDummy -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.20 -0.09 0.16 0.20 0.29 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.33 0.08 -0.33 0.00 -0.27 0.04 0.10 -0.15 0.20 -0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04
X Size -0.13 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.45 0.08 -0.06 0.16 0.23 -0.22 -0.01 0.18 0.18 0.11 -0.20 0.08 -0.44 0.01 0.18 -0.37 0.07 -0.06 0.68 -0.41 -0.11 -0.09
XI Leverage 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.15 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.38 0.12 -0.35 0.26 -0.29 0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.17 -0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.07 -0.01
XII BM -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.13 -0.01 0.03 -0.25 -0.09 0.09 0.04 0.15 -0.05 -0.27 -0.15 -0.16 0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.15 -0.09 -0.21 0.21 0.05 -0.02
XIII Returns -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.20 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.11 -0.08
XIV Acquisitions 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 -0.90 0.18 -0.19 0.04 0.07 -0.15 0.08 -0.12 0.13 -0.20 -0.03 0.00
XV CapIntensity -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.36 -0.29 0.12 0.23 0.10 0.25 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.55 -0.37 0.05 -0.23 0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.00
XVI Capex -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.23 -0.17 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.60 -0.12 0.27 -0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.02
XVII R&D 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.30 -0.17 -0.19 -0.23 -0.19 -0.21 0.01 -0.02 -0.21 -0.07 0.03 0.35 -0.03 0.03 0.32 -0.43 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.00
XVIII Financing 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.27 -0.08 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.01
XIX σCFO 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.20 -0.07 -0.18 -0.34 -0.14 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 -0.16 -0.03 0.51 0.16 -0.05 -0.16 0.30 -0.19 0.10 -0.20 0.27 0.06 0.03
XX Goodwill 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.11 0.13 0.07 -0.22 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.01
XXI Restructure -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.10 0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.12 0.02 0.10 -0.43 0.11 0.01 -0.02 -0.04
XXII Loss 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.38 0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.36 0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.03 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 0.40 -0.15 0.15
XXIII HHI -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.12 -0.06 0.12 0.16 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.16 -0.04 -0.10 0.04 0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.00
XXIV SpecItems -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.10 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.41 -0.15 -0.29 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.07 -0.03
XXV Analyst -0.09 0.03 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.28 0.07 -0.09 0.04 0.69 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.12 0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 0.02 0.10 -0.16 0.00 0.04 -0.25 -0.07 -0.06
XXVI Dispersion 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.22 0.07 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.01 -0.02 0.23 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 0.01 0.00
XXVII Surprise -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.15 0.00 0.12 0.03 -0.13 -0.78




Labor union and managerial information component (H1) 
 
Panel A: Managerial information component and Union     
               Presentation                                                  Q&A  
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
Union -0.062* -1.870 -0.119 -1.310 
Size -0.061*** -39.500 0.077*** 18.110 
Leverage 0.376*** 40.460 0.044* 1.850 
BM 0.073*** 14.630 0.003 0.260 
Returns -0.002*** -49.020 0.000 -0.870 
Acquisitions 1.167*** 50.480 0.390*** 6.270 
CapIntensity -0.342*** -24.440 -0.614*** -16.230 
Capex -0.660*** -12.430 0.265* 1.830 
R&D 8.802*** 115.840 6.630*** 33.740 
Financing2 0.182*** 26.400 0.075*** 4.350 
CFO 0.943*** 44.850 0.640*** 12.560 
Goodwill 0.057*** 8.370 0.010 0.530 
Restructure -0.023*** -6.250 0.063*** 6.340 
Industry fquarter fixed effect                   Yes                  Yes  
Firm cluster                   Yes                  Yes  
Obs               59,182             59,182  
Adj R2 (%)               76.44%              22.49%   
 
 
Panel B: Managerial information component and UnionDummy     
             Presentation                                     Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
UnionDummy -0.007* -1.930 -0.013 -1.260 
Size -0.056*** -37.230 0.088*** 21.160 
Leverage 0.406*** 43.410 0.108*** 4.260 
BM 0.081*** 18.550 0.015 1.280 
Returns -0.002*** -43.150 0.000 0.340 
Acquisitions 1.138*** 42.750 0.355*** 4.890 
CapIntensity -0.353*** -25.340 -0.656*** -17.070 
Capex -0.766*** -16.240 -0.053 -0.410 
R&D 9.023*** 101.030 7.045*** 29.510 
Financing2 0.189*** 25.830 0.064*** 3.430 
CFO 0.979*** 41.290 0.683*** 11.000 
Goodwill 0.070*** 9.640 0.045** 2.230 
Restructure -0.017*** -4.170 0.078*** 7.070 
Industry fquarter fixed effect                  Yes                 Yes  
Firm cluster                  Yes                 Yes  
Obs              47,199             47,199  
Adj R2 (%)              72.75%              23.64%   





Labor union and managerial obfuscation component (H2) 
 
Panel A: Managerial obfuscation component and Union     
          Presentation                   Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
Union -1.791*** -4.430 -0.380 -0.950 
Size -0.060*** -2.930 -0.010 -0.590 
Leverage -0.322*** -3.280 -0.066 -0.830 
BM -0.233*** -4.430 -0.017 -0.380 
Returns 0.001*** 3.940 0.000 0.180 
R&D -5.416*** -5.890 -1.423** -1.990 
Goodwill -0.122** -2.090 -0.086* -1.780 
Loss 0.158*** 4.630 0.072** 2.500 
HHI -0.454*** -2.860 -0.118 -0.900 
SpecItems -1.675*** -3.580 -0.653 -1.470 
Analyst 0.004 0.990 0.001 0.170 
Dispersion 0.426 0.920 0.256 0.700 
Surprise 18.524*** 2.870 5.738 0.810 
SmallBeat 0.045** 2.520 -0.020 -1.200 
Industry fquarter fixed effect                Yes               Yes  
Firm cluster                Yes               Yes  
Obs            59,182           59,182  
Adj R2 (%)            9.31%            3.31%   
 
Panel B: Managerial obfuscation component and UnionDummy     
           Presentation                    Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
UnionDummy -0.061 -1.320 -0.119*** -3.200 
Size -0.035* -1.720 -0.011 -0.700 
Leverage -0.272*** -2.660 0.044 0.530 
BM -0.090** -2.030 0.017 0.460 
Returns 0.001*** 3.990 0.000 1.320 
R&D -3.420*** -3.070 -0.975 -1.120 
Goodwill -0.133** -2.180 -0.060 -1.130 
Loss 0.188*** 5.470 0.120*** 3.990 
HHI -0.524*** -2.870 -0.193 -1.230 
SpecItems -1.081** -2.190 -0.169 -0.370 
Analyst 0.003 0.720 0.004 0.930 
Dispersion -0.079 -0.180 0.285 0.780 
Surprise 19.077*** 2.860 14.028** 2.060 
SmallBeat 0.036** 1.920 -0.022 -1.250 
Industry fquarter fixed effect             Yes               Yes  
Firm cluster             Yes               Yes  
Obs          47,199            47,199  
Adj R2 (%)          8.03%             3.86%   






Panel A: Managerial obfuscation component and Union (positive tone group) 
             Presentation                      Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
Union -1.899*** -12.920 -0.107 -0.710 
Size -0.012* -1.670 -0.021*** -2.820 
Leverage -0.025 -0.670 -0.034 -0.870 
BM -0.213*** -8.580 -0.100*** -3.960 
Returns 0.000 0.330 0.000 -0.280 
R&D -4.390*** -12.210 -2.001*** -5.480 
Goodwill -0.095 -1.420 -0.160** -2.350 
Loss 0.273*** 11.970 0.120*** 5.190 
HHI -0.609*** -13.460 -0.274*** -5.960 
SpecItems -0.859 -1.400 -0.980 -1.570 
Analyst -0.007*** -4.210 0.003* 1.930 
Dispersion 0.915*** 3.410 0.709*** 2.600 
Surprise 18.538** 1.990 6.832 0.720 
SmallBeat 0.038** 2.400 -0.006 -0.360 
Obs                32,942                  32,942  
Adj R2 (%)                2.04%               0.30%   
 
 
Panel B: Managerial obfuscation component and Union (negative tone group) 
             Presentation                      Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
Union -2.307*** -14.150 -0.439*** -2.700 
Size 0.018** 2.050 -0.033*** -3.790 
Leverage -0.082* -1.910 -0.056 -1.310 
BM -0.234*** -9.330 -0.072*** -2.900 
Returns 0.001*** 2.700 0.000 -0.960 
R&D -3.765*** -9.290 -1.648*** -4.080 
Goodwill -0.161*** -2.880 -0.039 -0.700 
Loss 0.247*** 10.470 0.099*** 4.200 
HHI -0.670*** -13.090 -0.294*** -5.760 
SpecItems -1.793*** -3.960 -0.206 -0.460 
Analyst -0.016*** -7.650 0.001 0.300 
Dispersion 0.942*** 3.610 0.482* 1.850 
Surprise 21.010*** 2.560 8.816 1.080 
SmallBeat 0.027 1.460 -0.027 -1.460 
Obs               26,164              26,164  







Panel C: Managerial obfuscation component and UnionDummy (positive tone group) 
              Presentation                       Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
UnionDummy -0.076*** -4.010 -0.118*** -6.240 
Size -0.010 -1.200 -0.005 -0.620 
Leverage -0.170*** -3.930 -0.042 -0.970 
BM -0.048** -2.010 -0.029 -1.220 
Returns 0.000 0.910 0.000 0.930 
R&D -1.728*** -3.750 -1.104** -2.410 
Goodwill -0.135* -1.770 -0.243*** -3.200 
Loss 0.236*** 8.610 0.182*** 6.650 
HHI -0.555*** -9.840 -0.196*** -3.490 
SpecItems -1.301* -1.940 -1.245* -1.870 
Analyst -0.004* -1.890 0.001 0.280 
Dispersion 0.236 0.780 -0.086 -0.280 
Surprise 6.400 0.610 -3.328 -0.320 
SmallBeat 0.016 0.870 -0.026 -1.440 
Obs              25,711             25,711  




Panel D: Managerial obfuscation component and UnionDummy (negative tone group) 
             Presentation                       Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
UnionDummy -0.125*** -5.870 -0.130*** -6.110 
Size 0.016* 1.750 -0.006 -0.620 
Leverage -0.183*** -4.020 0.092** 2.020 
BM 0.012 0.530 -0.005 -0.240 
Returns 0.001* 1.760 0.000 -0.500 
R&D -1.802*** -3.640 -0.261 -0.530 
Goodwill -0.105* -1.680 0.020 0.320 
Loss 0.225*** 8.720 0.089*** 3.460 
HHI -0.615*** -10.120 -0.281*** -4.620 
SpecItems -0.604 -1.210 0.042 0.080 
Analyst -0.006*** -2.760 -0.002 -0.680 
Dispersion 0.051 0.190 0.635** 2.310 
Surprise 24.483*** 2.970 30.624*** 3.710 
SmallBeat 0.040* 1.890 0.000 -0.010 
Obs               21,446             21,446  
Adj R2 (%)               1.35%              0.51%   









Labor union and tones 
 
Panel A: Managerial positive tone and Union       
             Presentation                     Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
Union -3.073 -0.300 7.526 1.590 
HHI 9.942*** 2.930 2.093 1.210 
Size 5.107*** 15.410 6.418*** 34.840 
BM 1.386 1.270 -0.169 -0.270 
Returns 0.046*** 8.670 0.045*** 12.040 
Earnings 0.675* 1.900 -0.455* -1.930 
EARN_sd 2.562 1.220 -1.558 -1.150 
Age -0.002 -0.090 0.016 1.200 
Capex -30.837*** -2.580 -8.908 -1.410 
R&D -54.275*** -3.450 -29.309*** -2.980 
Loss 4.061*** 6.590 0.644* 1.660 
Industry fquarter fixed effect                   Yes               Yes  
Firm cluster                   Yes               Yes  
Obs               59,143           59,143  
Adj R2 (%)               14.52%            27.34%  
 
 
Panel B: Managerial positive tone and UnionDummy       
           Presentation                      Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
UnionDummy 0.987 0.990 0.504 0.890 
HHI 8.052** 2.130 2.560 1.290 
Size 5.474*** 15.060 5.768*** 27.950 
BM 1.787* 1.690 -0.191 -0.300 
Returns 0.057*** 9.460 0.042*** 9.270 
Earnings 0.651 1.510 -0.428* -1.660 
EARN_sd 7.869*** 2.780 0.689 0.380 
Age -0.002 -0.060 0.019 1.270 
Capex -33.656*** -3.610 0.907 0.160 
R&D -47.673** -2.490 -42.386*** -3.590 
Loss 3.693*** 5.420 0.238 0.570 
Industry fquarter fixed effect                Yes                 Yes  
Firm cluster                Yes                 Yes  
Obs            38,706             38,706  









Panel C: Managerial negative tone and Union       
           Presentation                     Q&A 
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
Union 5.828 0.990 6.791** 2.240 
HHI 6.007*** 3.900 1.232 1.090 
Size 1.994*** 12.830 3.687*** 31.860 
BM 4.695*** 7.560 1.465*** 3.950 
Returns -0.062*** -19.540 -0.016*** -6.070 
Earnings 0.125 0.740 -0.404*** -2.730 
EARN_sd 2.226* 1.910 1.066 1.220 
Age 0.004 0.380 -0.005 -0.610 
Capex -17.673*** -3.260 3.311 0.850 
R&D -78.112*** -9.970 -32.921*** -5.340 
Loss 8.273*** 23.530 1.468*** 6.360 
Industry fquarter fixed effect                Yes                 Yes  
Firm cluster                Yes                 Yes  
Obs               59,143             59,143  




Panel D: Managerial negative tone and UnionDummy     
            Presentation                                                           Q&A  
  coeff. t-stats coeff. t-stats 
UnionDummy 1.951*** 3.850 1.250*** 3.240 
HHI 5.832*** 3.210 1.717 1.280 
Size 1.994*** 11.200 3.438*** 25.160 
BM 3.984*** 6.670 0.980** 2.440 
Returns -0.054*** -14.690 -0.012*** -3.820 
Earnings 0.233 1.270 -0.569*** -3.550 
EARN_sd 3.596** 2.470 1.884 1.620 
Age -0.004 -0.290 0.006 0.590 
Capex -21.795*** -4.590 8.588** 2.240 
R&D -82.063*** -8.440 -46.366*** -6.060 
Loss 8.683*** 20.720 1.639*** 5.700 
Industry fquarter fixed effect                  Yes               Yes  
Firm cluster                  Yes               Yes  
Obs              38,706           38,706  
Adj R2 (%)              19.63%            18.29%   











Hilary (2006) replication 
 
Panel A: Information asymmetry-spread 
  Presentation 
  coeff. t-stats 
Union 0.215*** 2.620 
Analyst -0.006*** -10.920 
NASD -0.021** -2.220 
Size -0.069*** -14.080 
ReturnSD 2.733*** 8.670 
BM 0.013*** 5.330 
Leverage 0.002 0.880 
Rating 0.010 1.260 
ROA -0.134*** -4.140 
HHI -0.055** -2.220 
Industry fyear fixed effect             Yes   
Firm cluster             Yes  
Obs              45,850  




Panel B: Information asymmetry-analyst 
  Presentation 
  coeff. t-stats 
Union -8.952*** -4.800 
Spread -2.571*** -9.660 
NASD 1.464*** 6.390 
Size 1.109*** 11.290 
ReturnSD -42.177*** -6.550 
BM 1.127*** 17.840 
Leverage -0.026 -0.470 
Rating -0.241 -0.950 
ROA -0.862* -1.730 
HHI -1.424*** -3.020 
Industry fyear fixed effect             Yes  
Firm cluster             Yes  
Obs               45,850  











Panel C: Information asymmetry-trading volume 
  Presentation 
  coeff. t-stats 
Union -0.669** -2.310 
Spread -1.609*** -26.840 
NASD 0.203*** 6.050 
Size 0.038** 2.440 
ReturnSD 6.560*** 5.740 
BM 0.425*** 46.110 
Leverage 0.098*** 11.750 
Rating 0.044 1.260 
ROA -0.230*** -2.660 
HHI -0.053 -0.690 
Industry fyear fixed effect                      Yes  
Firm cluster                      Yes  
Obs                      45,850  
Adj R2 (%)                       77.83%   
Note:  ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tail), respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
